I study the e¤ects of long-run in ‡ation and income taxation in an economy where households face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks. I construct a tractable competitive search framework that generates dispersion of prices, income and wealth. I analytically characterize the stationary equilibrium and the policy e¤ects on individual choices. Quantitative analysis …nds that monetary and …scal policies have distinctive e¤ects on macro aggregates, such as output, savings, wealth dispersion, income and consumption inequalities. There can be a hump-shape relationship between welfare and the respective policies. Overall, welfare can be maximized by a deviation from the Friedman rule, paired with distortionary income taxation. JEL Classi…cation Codes: E0, E4, E5, E6, H2, H3.
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Introduction
I construct a tractable framework of competitive search that endogenously generates dispersion of prices, wealth and income. With this framework, I investigate the e¤ects of long-run in ‡ation and income taxation on the macroeconomy, as well as the interaction of the two policies. Wealth and income dispersions prevail in modern economies. In the presence of such distributions, monetary and …scal policies are likely to have uneven impacts on households, generating non-trivial e¤ects on real activities and welfare. To maximize welfare, policy makers must have a good understanding of the distributional policy e¤ects. In the case where monetary and …scal authorities are independent of one another, it is also important to understand policy interactions. This is particularly relevant given the context that there have been formulations of central banks and monetary unions, as well as attempts made to form …scal unions in recent years.
Despite its importance, it is a challenging task to study both policies in a heterogeneousagent environment. This is because the individual decision problem is generally a¤ected by the endogenous wealth distribution. Solving the model involves handling problems with large dimensions. Policy analysis further enhances the di¢ culty because it entails computing and comparing equilibrium outcomes in various policy scenarios. Therefore, it is a rare attempt in the literature to examine the distributional e¤ects of monetary and …scal policies simultaneously.
In my model, households and …rms can trade in frictionless and frictional goods markets. The frictional market contains a variety of submarkets and is characterized by competitive search. Households make tradeo¤s between the terms of trade and matching probabilities when choosing which submarket to participate in. Search is competitive in that both households and …rms take as exogenous the terms of trade and the matching probabilities across all submarkets. In equilibrium, a submarket that requires a higher payment per transaction o¤ers a higher quantity of goods per transaction and also a higher probability for a buyer to be matched for a transaction. Households face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks on labor preferences, which lead to diverse decisions on consumption, precautionary savings, labor supply and trading strategies. In equilibrium there will arise dispersions of price, income and wealth.
Competitive search is a critical feature of this model because it o¤ers signi…cant tractability. Unlike commonly-studied bilateral bargaining in a search environment, here individual traders cannot a¤ect any of the market speci…cations, i.e. terms of trade and matching probabilities, due to the competitive nature of the search process. With given trading speci…cations, a household need not consider the amount of money that its potential trading partner might have, when making its optimal decisions. As a result, the household decision 2 problem can be solved without involving the endogenous money distribution, which greatly reduces the state space and renders the model tractable. I analytically characterize the stationary equilibrium and the policy e¤ects on individual decisions. Policies include long-run money growth maintained by lump-sum transfers and a proportional income tax. The government balances budget and rebates tax revenues in a lump-sum manner. I numerically examine the policy implications on the macroeconomy. The key …ndings are the following: First, both policies can directly a¤ect the intensive and extensive margins (i.e., the quantity per trade and the trading probability per buyer), and also indirectly through altering household choices of spending in the frictional market. Quantitatively, the indirect e¤ects tend to dominate the direct ones. In ‡ation can stimulate spending and thus has a positive overall e¤ect on both margins, while income taxation does the opposite. Overall, in ‡ation increases output and consumption but decreases precautionary savings. Income taxation has the opposite e¤ects.
Second, the e¤ect of in ‡ation on wealth dispersion depends on the tax regime. The positive e¤ect tends to dominate at lower tax rates while the negative e¤ect tends to dominate at higher tax rates. Income taxation decreases wealth dispersion regardless of the monetary policy. Moreover, in ‡ation decreases income inequality but increases consumption inequality. Taxation has a positive e¤ect on both income and consumption inequalities.
Finally, in ‡ation and taxation can respectively have a hump-shape relationship with welfare. The welfare-improving role of in ‡ation is sensitive to the status of the …scal policy. It is important to coordinate the two policies. Welfare can be maximized by a deviation from the Friedman rule together with distortionary income taxation. When the monetary and …scal authorities are independent authorities, a change of policy by one has non-trivial implications on the optimal policy choice of the other.
This framework is based on Rocheteau and Wright (2005;  henceforth RW) and Menzio, Shi and Sun (2011; henceforth MSS), the former of which studies competitive search in an environment follows Lagos and Wright (2005; henceforth LW). The LW structure features quasi-linear preferences and alternating frictional and frictionless markets. It is a tractable framework because its equilibrium money distribution is degenerate. 1 Nevertheless, it does not provide insights on the distributional policy e¤ects. Menzio, Shi and Sun (2011) construct a tractable monetary environment with non-degenerate money distributions. Because of competitive search, the model has the feature of block recursivity, which means that individual decision problems can be solved independently from the endogenous distributions. 2 Nevertheless, the framework of MSS abstracts away from money growth.
To analyze policy e¤ects while maintaining model tractability, I construct a model that combines the key features of LW/RW and MSS. With quasi-linear preferences, access to frictionless markets and competitive search, the model is block recursive even in the context of both monetary and …scal policies. This paper is closely related to the literature of heterogeneous-agent economies that study the distributional e¤ect of monetary policy. In these models, money is valued either because of the cash-in-advance constraint (e.g. Imrohorglu, 1992; Erosa and Ventura, 2002; Camera and Chien, 2011), or for precautionary purpose (e.g. Akyol, 2004; Wen, 2010; Dressler, 2011) , or due to search frictions (e.g. Molico, 2006; Boel and Camera, 2009; Chiu and Molico, 2010) . In most of these models, agents trade in Walrasian markets. Such models are not able to generate equilibrium price dispersion. The search model can be a natural environment to have dispersion of prices, e.g. Molico (2006) and Chiu and Molico (2010) , where agents trade in decentralized markets and bargain bilaterally. In contrast to search models with bargaining, my model features competitive search, which signi…cantly improves tractability. Finally, none of the above literature examines the distributional e¤ects of monetary and …scal policies simultaneously, which is in contrast the main goal of my paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the physical model environment. Section 3 characterizes the stationary equilibrium. Section 4 presents analytical policy e¤ects. Section 5 discusses numerical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
A Uni…ed Macroeconomic Framework

The environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each time period consists of two sub-periods. The economy is populated by a measure one of ex ante identical households. Each household consists of a worker and a buyer. All households consume general goods in the …rst subperiod and special goods in the second sub-period. There are di¤erent types of special goods. Every period a household faces a random preference shock, which determines with equal probability the type of special goods to consume in the current period. Household members share income, consumption and labor cost. The preference of a household in a time period is
where y is consumption of general goods, q is consumption of special goods and l is labor input in a time period. The variable measures the random disutility per unit of labor. It is i.i.d. across households and over time, and is drawn from the probability distribution F ( ) with support ; , where 0 < < < 1. The value of is realized at the beginning of every period, before any decisions are made. The functions u and U are twice continuously di¤erentiable and have the usual properties:
1) = 0; and u 0 (0) and U 0 (0) being large but …nite.
Households discount future with factor 2 (0; 1). All goods are perishable across subperiods. There is no insurance on idiosyncratic risks. Nor is borrowing or lending feasible among households. There is a …at object called money, which is storable without cost. General goods are traded in competitive and frictionless markets. Special goods are traded in frictional markets in that trades are decentralized and that buyers and sellers are randomly matched in pair-wise meetings. Trading frictions are driven by households' random demand for special goods. There is a measure one of competitive …rms. Firms hire workers from households, who own equal shares of all …rms. The labor market is competitive. Labor is hired at the beginning of a period and is used in production for both general and special goods. Each …rm can organize production of general goods and one type of special goods. In each period the frictionless goods market opens in the …rst sub-period, followed by the frictional market in the second sub-period. 3 Trading in a frictional market is characterized by competitive search. This market contains a variety of submarkets. Each submarket is characterized by (x; q; b; s), where (x; q) are the terms of trade and (b; s) are the respective matching probabilities for a buyer and a shop. Search is competitive in the sense that households and …rms take as given the characteristics of all submarkets, when making their trading decisions. Buyers and shops are randomly matched in a pair-wise manner because households and …rms cannot coordinate. A buyer can enter at most one submarket in each period. Firms have free entry to all submarkets and choose the measure of shops to operate in each submarket. The cost of operating a shop for one period is k > 0 units of labor. Moreover, producing q units of special goods requires (q) units of labor, where is twice continuously di¤erentiable with the usual properties: 0 > 0, 00 0 and (0) = 0. In equilibrium free entry of …rms is such that the characteristics of submarkets are consistent with the speci…ed ones.
The matching technology has constant returns to scale and is such that s = (b). In equilibrium the matching probabilities of each submarket become functions of the terms of trade (x; q), as is shown in (4) . Therefore, a submarket can be su¢ ciently indexed by I focus on the steady state equilibrium and suppress the time index throughout the paper. The per capita money stock is …xed at M for now. I will allow money growth and income taxation when I analyze policy e¤ects in section 4. Labor is the numeraire. In particular, let m denote the real value of a household's money balance measured in terms of labor units. Let w denote the normalized wage rate, which is the nominal wage rate divided by the money stock M . Then the dollar amount associated with a balance m is (wM ) m.
A …rm' s decision
In the frictionless market, a representative …rm takes the general-good price as given and chooses output Y to maximize pro…t. For simplicity, it takes one unit of labor to produce one unit of general goods. Let p be the price of general goods, measured in terms of labor. In the frictional market, the …rm takes the terms of trade for each submarket, (x; q), as given and chooses the measure of shops, dN (x; q), to set up in each submarket. Recall that a shop is matched by a buyer with probability s (x; q). For a particular shop in the submarket, the operational cost is k units of labor and the expected cost of production is (q) s (x; q) units of labor. A shop's expected revenue is xs (x; q), where the revenue x is measured in labor units. The …rm's total pro…t in a period is
The …rst item on the right-hand side denotes the …rm's pro…t in the frictionless market and the second item its pro…t in the frictional market. Free entry of …rms implies that the …rm earns zero pro…t and thus p = 1 in equilibrium. Zero-pro…t in the frictional market requires
where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness. In particular, if the expected pro…t of operating a shop s (x; q) [x (q)] k < 0, then the …rm will choose 
The free-entry condition pins down the matching probabilities in a submarket as functions of the terms of trade. Indeed, a submarket can be su¢ ciently indexed by the terms of trade, (x; q).
A household' s decision 2.3.1 Decision in the frictionless market
Let W (m; ) be a household's value at the beginning of a period with real money balance m and the random realization . Given price p and the characteristics of all frictional submarkets, a household maximizes its value by choosing consumption of general goods y 0, labor input l 0, the real balance to spend in the frictional market z 0, and precautionary savings h 0. 5 If the household's buyer is matched with a shop in the frictional market, then the buyer spends z and the household carries h into the following period. Otherwise, the household carries a balance z + h into the following period. Moreover, z + h m, where m is the maximum real money balance that a household can carry across periods. I assume 0 < m < U 0 1
. The dividend is paid to the household at the end of a period. In equilibrium = 0 because …rms earn zero pro…t.
The value W (m; ) satis…es the following Bellman equation:
s:t:
The constraint in the above is a budget constraint. 6 The function V (z; h) is the household's value at the beginning of the second sub-period, i.e., immediately before the frictional market opens. Because the analysis on the decisions of frictional trading is much involved, I will postpone fully characterizing V until the next sub-section. In Lemma 3, I show that V is di¤erentiable and concave in z and h. For now, I take such information as given. Given U 0 > 0, the budget constraint must hold with equality and thus
where I have incorporated the equilibrium price p = 1. For now I assume that the choice of l is interior, which I will verify later. Using (6) to eliminate l in the objective function yields
The optimal choices must satisfy the following …rst-order conditions:
V z (z; h) ( ; and z 0 ; and z m h;
V h (z; h) ( ; and h 0 ; and h m z (10) 6 Note that the household's spending in the frictional market is not constrained by its initial money holdings of the period. This is because in this environment both money and …rm IOUs can be used in all transactions. Firm IOUs take the form of a …rm's promise of wage payments at the end of a period, in terms of money. Firm IOUs are settled in a central clearinghouse at the end of a period. Such IOUs are enforceable because …rms are large (in the sense that each of them owns a positive measure of shops) and thus they have deterministic revenues and costs, although individual shops face matching risks. Firms last for one period and new ones are formed at the beginning of the next. Thus …rm IOUs can be circulated for only one period. Nevertheless, personal IOUs of households are not accepted as a medium of exchange because households face idiosyncratic preference and matching risks and there is no enforcement on their IOUs. No particular type of goods is cash goods in this environment because both …at money and …rm IOUs can be used in all transactions. This is in contrast with standard money search models, where goods traded in the frictional markets are considered cash goods. In these models, …at money must be used as a medium of exchange to overcome the lack of double coincidence of wants and record-keeping of individual traders.
8 where all sets of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Given 0 < m < U 0 1 , it follows that
for all 2 ; . Then condition (8) implies that the choice of y is always interior and satis…es
Clearly, the household's current money balance m does not a¤ect the optimal choices of y, z or h, although it does a¤ect l. Let the policy functions be y ( ), z ( ), h ( ) and l (m; ).
Note that z ( ) + h ( ) 0 for all 2 ; and that m m. Therefore, (6) and (11) > m. Given (7), the value function W is
where
The preceding exposition proves the following lemma:
The value function W is continuous and di¤erentiable in (m; ). It is also a¢ ne in m.
Decision in the frictional market
The household chooses whether to participate in the frictional market. If yes, then it chooses which submarket to enter and search for a trade. Given balances z and h, the household is faced with the following problem at the beginning of the second sub-period:
where q 0, x z and b (x; q) is determined by (4) . It is convenient to use condition (4) to eliminate q in the above objective function. Given linearity of W , the problem in (14) simpli…es to
The optimal choices satisfy the following …rst-order conditions
E ( ) 0; and x z; (16) 
If b (z) = 0, then the choices of x and q are irrelevant. In this case, the household chooses not to participate in the frictional submarket. Without loss of generality, I impose
It is obvious from (15) that the optimal choices are independent of z if the money constraint does not bind, i.e., x (z) < z. De…ne (q) (16) holds with equality. Then conditions (16) and (18) imply
Given q , using (18) to eliminate x in (17) yields
It is straightforward to show that the left-hand side of (20) is strictly increasing in b .
Moreover, b > 0 exists and is unique if E ( ) satis…es
Given unique values of q and b , x is uniquely determined by
Therefore, if condition (21) holds, then x (z) = z for all z < x and x (z) = x for all z x . If condition (21) fails to hold, then x (z) = z for all z 0. De…neẑ as the maximum value such that x (z) = z. Thusẑ = x if (21) holds andẑ = 1 otherwise.
In this environment, it is not necessary for the household to choose z higher than the amount x that it plans to spend in the frictional market. Without loss of generality, I impose x (z) = z in the rest of the analysis. In particular, consider z 2 [0;ẑ]. Given such z, the problem in (15) becomes
The value B (z) is the household's expected trade surplus. If b > 0, it must be the case that q > 0 and that the surplus from trade is strictly positive:
Moreover, the optimal choice of b satis…es condition (17) given x = z.
Lottery choice. It is necessary to mention that the value function B (z) may not be concave in z because the objective function in (24) may not be jointly concave in its state and choice variables, (z; b). This objective function involves the product between the choice variable b itself and a function of b. Even if both of these two terms are concave, the product may not be jointly concave. Above all, it is unclear whether either of the two terms is a concave function of z, given that b is a choice variable and is yet to be determined. To make the household's value function concave, I introduce lotteries with regards to the balance z, as in Menzio, Shi and Sun (2011). In particular, lotteries are available every period immediately before trading in the frictional market takes place. A lottery is characterized by (L 1 ; L 2 ; 1 ; 2 ). If a household plays the lottery, it will 11 win the prize L 2 with probability 2 . The household loses the lottery with probability 1 , in which case it receives a payment of L 1 . There is a complete set of lotteries available. Given z, a household's optimal choice of lottery solves:
subject to
Denote the policy functions as L i (z) and i (z), respectively, where i = 1; 2. If the household is better o¤ not playing any lottery, it is trivial to see that Figure 1 illustrates how the lottery can help make the value functionṼ (z) concave, even though the function B (z) has some strictly convex part. It is intuitive to see that a household will choose to play a lottery if it has a very low balance. As is shown in Figure   1 , for any balance z 2 (0; z 0 ), it is optimal for the household to participate in the lottery o¤ering the prize z 0 . The lottery makesṼ (z) linear whenever B (z) is strictly convex. The properties of z 0 are presented in part (iii) of Lemma 2.
Properties of value and policy functions
Lemma 2 The value function B (z) is continuous and increasing in z 2 [0;ẑ]. The value functionṼ (z) is continuous, di¤erentiable, increasing and concave in z 2 [0;ẑ]. For z such that b (z) = 0, the value function B(z) = 0. In this case, the choice of q is irrelevant. There exists z > 0 such that b (z) > 0 if and only if there exists q > 0 that satis…es
Moreover, the following results hold: (i) The policy functions b (z) and q (z) are unique and strictly increasing in z. In particular, b (z) solves
Moreover, b (z) strictly decreases in E ( ) while q (z) strictly increases in E ( ); (ii) There exists
There exists z 0 > z 1 such that a household with z < z 0 will play the lottery with the prize
Lemma 2 (see Appendix A for a proof) summarizes the properties of the household's value and policy functions in the frictional market. According to part (i), the optimal choices of (q; b) are strictly increasing in z when the household chooses b > 0 to participate in frictional trading. In this case, the higher a balance the household spends, the higher a quantity it obtains and the higher the matching probability at which it trades. As a result, households endogenously sort themselves into di¤erent submarkets based on their balances to spend. For any given z, a higher value of E ( ) implies a lower matching probability for the buyer and a higher amount of goods to be purchased by the buyer. The intuition is the following: Given higher E ( ), it becomes more costly for …rms to hire labor. Firms respond by setting up fewer shops in a submarket but increasing quantity produced per trade. This helps save the …xed cost of operating shops and steer more labor into production. All else equal, more shops in a submarket lead to a higher matching probability for a shop, which tends to increase a …rm's revenue. Thus the …rm can a¤ord to o¤er a higher quantity per trade, even though it requires a higher labor input. In this case, households face a lower matching probability for a buyer. Nevertheless, the households are compensated by an increase in the quantity per purchase.
Recall that V is the value of a household at the beginning of the second sub-period before trading decisions are made. Given (12) , (23), (24) and (26), V is given by
Clearly V is linear in h. Recall from (7) that the household chooses z and h to solve the 13 following problem:
It follows that h ( ) > 0 if and only if is such thatṼ
as de…ned in (22) . In this case, h ( ) = m x . For all such that z ( ) < x , it must be that h ( ) = 0. Then (6) implies
Given Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is trivial to derive the following lemma:
(ii) Policy functions y ( ), z ( ) and h ( ) are decreasing functions. The policy function l (m; ) is decreasing in both m and .
Stationary Equilibrium
De…nition 1 A stationary equilibrium consists of household values (W; B;Ṽ ; V ) and choices (y; l; z; h; (q; b) ; (L 1 ; L 2 ; 1 ; 2 )); …rm choices (Y; dN (x; q)); price p and wage rate w. These elements satisfy the following requirements: (i) Given the realizations of shocks, asset balances, prices and terms of trade, a household's choices solve (7), (24) , (26) and (30), which induce the value functions W (m; ), B(z),Ṽ (z) and V (z; h); (ii) Given prices and terms of trade, …rms maximize pro…t and solve (2); (iii) Free entry condition: The function s(x; q) satis…es (4); (iv) All labor markets, general-good markets and money markets clear; (v) Stationarity: All quantities, prices and distributions are time invariant; (vi) Symmetry: Households in the same idiosyncratic state make the same optimal decisions.
The above de…nition is self-explanatory. The labor-market-clearing condition implies that the equilibrium normalized wage rate w is determined by
I derive the above market-clearing condition in Appendix D. Given the equilibrium de…n-ition, I have the following theorem (see Appendix B for a proof):
Theorem 2 A stationary equilibrium exists. It is unique if and only if the lottery choices fL 1 (z ( )) ; L 2 (z ( )) ; 1 (z ( )) ; 2 (z ( ))g are unique for all z ( ). Moreover, the following results hold: (i) The general-good consumption y ( ) > 0 for all ; (ii) If there does not exist q > 0 that satis…es condition (27), then z ( ) = 0 for all . Otherwise, z ( ) > 0 for some .
According to Theorem 2, frictionless markets are always active, while frictional markets are not. A necessary condition for frictional markets to be used is that condition (27) holds for some q > 0. This condition depends on the preferences and the production technology for special goods, the discount factor and the value of E ( ). Intuitively, if the utility derived from consuming special goods is too low, or if the production cost of special goods is too high, consumption of special goods can become too costly, especially considering the uncertainty involved in obtaining such goods. Similarly, if E ( ) is too high, then the cost of labor is high, which drives up the cost of producing special goods and hence suppresses the demand. These results are consistent with the …ndings in Camera (2000) . In a model without distributional components, Camera shows that the frictional market is used in equilibrium when households can have su¢ ciently high expected consumption relative to that in the frictionless market.
Note that this equilibrium is remarkably tractable. None of the decision problems (7), (24), (26) and (30) is a¤ected by the endogenous money distribution. Therefore, one can solve these decision problems …rst, and then use the household optimal decisions to derive the equilibrium aggregates, together with income and wealth distributions. This model property is called block recursivity.
Policy E¤ects
I now analyze the e¤ects of monetary and …scal policies. Consider that the money stock per capita evolves according to M 0 = M , where is the money growth rate and M 0 is the money stock of the next period. Money growth is achieved by a lump-sum transfer from the government to households, and vice versa for money contraction. The government also imposes a proportional tax rate 2 [0; 1) on wage income. The government balances its budget every period. All tax revenues are redistributed from the government to households in a lump-sum manner. Transfers are made at the beginning of each period. All tax payments and transfers are made with money. The money market opens in the second subperiod of a period. First, it is straightforward to show that @y ( ) =@ 0 and @y ( ) =@ = 0. The former is a standard income e¤ect and the latter is also a standard result in the macro literature. 15
Second, policies directly a¤ect equilibrium trading strategies, q (z) and b (z). The e¤ect on q (z) is called the intensive-margin e¤ect and the one on b (z) the extensive-margin e¤ect.
Even with policies, all the results in Lemma 2 still hold, except that the policy functions b (z) and q (z) are jointly determined by
instead of (28) and (29). Then follows a proposition on policy e¤ects (see Appendix C for a proof):
Proposition 1 For all z such that b (z) > 0, the following results hold: (i) Given z, …scal policy has a positive direct e¤ect on the intensive margin and a negative direct e¤ect on the extensive margin, i.e., (iv) On the extensive margin, the overall …scal policy e¤ect is negative. The …scal policy e¤ect on the intensive margin is ambiguous given the opposing direct and indirect e¤ects.
Proposition 1 characterizes both direct and indirect policy e¤ects on intensive and extensive margins, b (z) and q (z). Each policy has a direct impact on the choices of b and q, as well as an indirect one through a¤ecting the choice of spending z. Part (i) summarize the direct e¤ects of proportional income taxes. A higher income tax rate makes households frugal on spending. For any given balance, a household chooses to visit a submarket that o¤ers a higher quantity of goods per trade, which is a positive e¤ect on the intensive margin. In such a submarket, a …rm's cost of production per trade is higher. Thus it reduces overall cost by setting up a smaller measure of shops in this submarket. This imposes a negative e¤ect along the extensive margin.
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 lists the direct monetary policy e¤ects on the margins. In particular, the real value of a money balance over time decreases with money growth. A household responds by sending its buyer to a submarket with a higher matching probability b, in order to increase the chance of spending money in the current period. In such a submarket, the matching probability for a shop is lower, which all else equal implies a lower pro…t for …rms. Zero pro…t condition requires that …rms must be compensated by producing a lower quantity per trade. These results of monetary policy are standard and have been well-documented in the money search literature.
Part (iii) shows that income taxes reduce spending z, which is an income e¤ect. Thus taxation also has a negative indirect e¤ect on the margins because b and q are increasing in z. Money growth has an ambiguous e¤ect on z. Intuitively, in ‡ation tax weakens a household's incentives for precautionary savings, which causes a positive e¤ect on z as the household switches some savings (future consumption) to spending on current consumption. On the other hand, money growth also has a negative e¤ect on z as the household has the incentives to reduce spending in the frictional market. This is because an unmatched participation in the frictional market will result in the household carrying the unspent money balance into the future and bearing the in ‡ation tax. If the household values consumption of special goods high enough, the …rst e¤ect dominates and thus in ‡ation can have a positive indirect e¤ect on both margins by increasing z ( ). The result in part (iv) is self-explanatory and follows directly from the previous parts.
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that all the results in parts (i), (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 1 are novel analytical results in the current literature on search-theoretic models of money. The literature has rarely analyzed the e¤ect of …scal policy on frictional trading strategies, let alone in a heterogeneous-agent environment.
Numerical Results
I now report numerical results on policy e¤ects. I employ the following functional forms:
As the benchmark computation, I adopt the following parameter values: 
The model period is set to be one year. The discount factor is chosen to match an annual interest rate of 4%. The parameters m; are such that all households have interior labor choices under the considered policy values. This is important for tractability because it allows one to transform the decision problem (5) into (7). This way, the household's choices of (y; z; h; q; b; L 1 ; L 2 ; 1 ; 2 ) are independent of the state variable m and also the money distribution. After the benchmark case, I will also discuss results from variations on the values of U 0 ; u ; k; ; ; .
Computation strategy. This model is block recursive even with monetary and …scal policies. The decision problems are listed in (41)-(44), none of which is a¤ected by equilibrium distributions. For simulations, one can …rst solve these problems, and then derive the equilibrium wage rate, the government transfer and the macro aggregates using the formulas presented in Appendix D.
Policy functions. Panel A of Figure 2 depicts a household's optimal lottery choice given balance z. In particular, z 0 = 0:027. That is, any household with z 2 (0; 0:027) will play the lottery of receiving either a payment of 0:027 or nothing. For households with z > 0:027, the functions L 1 (z) and L 2 (z) almost always coincide, indicating that the lottery is almost never played at higher z values. Moreover, for the policy parameters considered here, a household with any 2 ; never chooses z ( ) 0:027. Therefore, the lottery choice is quantitatively negligible in this numerical exercise. For expositional convenience, I will ignore lotteries when presenting the rest of the numerical results. Nevertheless, all computation results presented in this paper are carried out with the lottery choice.
Panel B of Figure 2 depicts the policy functions under various policy regimes. In the top right panel of Figure 2 B, the blue curve coincides with the green curve and is completely blocked by the latter. In the bottom three panels, all three colored curves are not always discernible in the graphs because they often coincide with one another. In each panel, a shift from the blue curve to the red one represents the e¤ect of an increased income tax rate (from = 0 to = 0:25) given a money growth rate ( = 0:96). Similarly, a shift from the blue curve to the green one represents the e¤ect of an increased money growth rate (from = 0:96 to = 1:18) given the …scal policy ( = 0). A few observations follow immediately: S1. y ( ), z ( ) and h ( ) are decreasing functions, while b (z) and q (z) are increasing functions. This con…rms the corresponding results in Lemmas 2 and 3; S2. (a) Consider a given . For any , a higher decreases z ( ) and y ( ), but increases savings h ( ). The e¤ect of on z is consistent with part (iii) of Proposition 1.
(b) Consider a given . Money growth increases the transaction balance z ( ) but decreases savings h ( ). It has no e¤ect on y ( ). According to part (iii) of Proposition 1, the e¤ect of on z can be either positive or negative. Here the numerical results suggest that the positive e¤ect dominates.
(c) There is equilibrium price dispersion as the equilibrium prices z ( ) =q (z ( )) vary with the realizations of .
(d) Neither nor has a signi…cant impact on the functions b (z), q (z) or the price function z=q (z). This suggests that the direct policy e¤ects summarized in parts (i)-(ii) of Proposition 1 can be quantitatively small.
The results in S2 are intuitive. All else equal, a higher income tax rate makes it more costly to supply labor. Accordingly, the household saves more and becomes more frugal on spending. However, the higher tax rate stimulates precautionary savings because it helps alleviate the elevated disutility of labor supply in a higher-state. In ‡ation has no e¤ect on consumption of goods traded in the frictionless market, which is a standard result. All else equal, in ‡ation tax causes the household to save less yet spend more on goods traded in the frictional market.
Aggregate margins, output and labor.
S3. In ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on both of the aggregate intensive and extensive margins, while the tax rate has a negative e¤ect on them. In ‡ation increases aggregate output and labor in the frictional market, while the income taxes decrease such aggregates. Figure 3 depicts the policy e¤ects on aggregate intensive and extensive margins. The …rst column is for the intensive margin, i.e. average quantity per trade in the frictional market, and the second column is for the extensive margin, i.e. volume of transactions in the frictional market. The …rst row shows the monetary policy e¤ect and the second row is for the …scal policy. Figure 4 shows the policy e¤ects on aggregate output and labor in the frictional market. Recall from S2 and Figure 2 that the direct policy e¤ects on the optimal choices of (b; q) are quantitatively small and are dominated by the indirect policy e¤ects through z. Since (b; q) are increasing functions of z, a higher causes both to rise, 19
which further leads to a positive e¤ect on both margins as is shown by Figure 3 . The boost to the margins results in a rise in both output and labor. Finally, the policy e¤ects on output and labor in the frictionless market are standard. The monetary policy has no e¤ect on either aggregate and the …scal policy imposes a negative e¤ect on them. I omit their numerical characterizations due to limited space. The positive relationship between in ‡ation and output in the top left panel of Figure   4 is in strong contrast to the results from the previous literature. Typically, a monetary search model either delivers a negative in ‡ation-output relationship or a hump-shape one. This is because …at money is required as a medium of exchange in such models. As a result, in ‡ation tax eventually will bring down output as in ‡ation gets severe. Similarly, cash-in-advance models typically …nd a negative relationship between in ‡ation and output. 7 In contrast, here in this model money is used for precautionary purposes rather than transaction purposes. Households can use money and/or …rm credit to buy goods. In ‡a-tion causes households to increase their desired trading probabilities and to decrease their precautionary savings, the latter of which is obvious from the top middle panel in Figure   2 B. Therefore, at very high in ‡ation rates, precautionary savings go to zero. Moreover, the trading probabilities for a buyer in the frictional market approach one and thus households carry little unspent money balances over time. Together, the entire economy functions as if it were a cash-less economy. As a result, output increases with in ‡ation and stays ‡at at very high money growth rates. This is consistent with the empirical …ndings for the U.S. and some other countries, suggesting a positive long-run relationship between in ‡ation and output at low in ‡ation rates and little e¤ects at high in ‡ation rates (see Wealth distribution.
S4. In ‡ation has a negative e¤ect on average wealth while income taxation has a positive e¤ect on it. The e¤ect of in ‡ation on wealth dispersion depends on the income tax rate. The positive e¤ect tends to dominate at lower tax rates while the negative e¤ect tends to dominate at higher tax rates. 8 Given money growth, income taxation reduces wealth dispersion. 7 Molico (2006) reports a hump-shape relationship between in ‡ation and output in a search environment with endogenous money distributions. Camera and Chien (2011) …nd a negative relationship between in ‡ation and output in a cash-in-advance environment with endogenous money distributions. Moreover, the negative e¤ect of in ‡ation on output by no means limits to models with heterogeneous agents. It is also common among monetary models with degenerate money distributions. Figure 5 depicts the policy e¤ect of in ‡ation on wealth distribution. Here a household's wealth is interpreted as its beginning-of-period real money balances after receiving the government transfer T given by equation (49). Therefore, the average wealth consists of aggregate precautionary savings, aggregate unspent balances and the transfer. Recall from S2 that higher in ‡ation causes households to save less (lower h) and spend more (higher z) at a higher frequency (higher b). Thus in ‡ation decreases aggregate savings. Its e¤ect on aggregate unspent balances can be ambiguous. On one hand, households plan on spending more, which means the level of unspent balances held by a household is also higher. On the other hand, households also choose to trade with a higher probability, which reduces the chance of holding an unspent balance across periods. The government transfer includes the monetary component to achieve money growth and the …scal component from taxation on labor income. Both components increase with in ‡ation. The former is because of money injection and the latter is because aggregate labor increases as in ‡ation rises. Overall, the negative e¤ect of in ‡ation dominates, which indicates that the negative impact of in ‡ation on precautionary savings is the dominating force. Now consider the positive relationship between income taxation and average wealth. Recall from S2 that taxation makes households save more (higher h) and spend less (lower z) at a lower frequency (lower b). Moreover, higher tax rates reduce aggregate labor and thus the …scal component of government transfers. Altogether, the positive e¤ect of income taxation dominates, which again is likely to the result of the dominating e¤ect on precautionary savings. Now consider the policy e¤ects on the coe¢ cient of variation of wealth. Since all households receive the same amount of transfers, wealth dispersion critically depends on the dispersion of precautionary savings and unspent balances. A rise in in ‡ation tends to increase dispersion in household unspent balances (due to trading frictions) but decrease dispersion in household savings, which is suggested to a certain extent in Figure 2 by the changes in the functions z ( ) and h ( ) under various policy regimes. Nevertheless, as the tax rate rises, households increase savings, which allows the e¤ect of in ‡ation on savings to make a stronger presence. As is shown by the top right panel of Figure 5 , the positive e¤ect of in ‡ation on dispersion in household unspent balances tends to dominate when the tax rate is low (e.g. = 0). Then at higher tax rates, the negative e¤ect on savings tends to dominate. In contrast, income taxation unambiguously decreases wealth dispersion.
Chiu and Molico (2010) establish a negative relationship between in ‡ation and the dispersion of the money distribution. In a model where heterogeneous agents use money to self-insure against liquidity shocks, Dressler (2011) demonstrates that in ‡ation increases dispersion in money balances. In a cash-inadvance environment with heterogeneous agents, Camera and Chien (2011) show that in ‡ation reduces wealth dispersion when money is the only asset, but has little e¤ect on wealth inequality when bonds are introduced. Moreover, none of the above papers consider the relevance of a …scal policy regime.
Income and consumption inequalities.
S5
. In ‡ation has a negative e¤ect on income inequality but a positive e¤ect on consumption inequality. 9 Income taxation has a positive e¤ect on both income inequality and consumption inequality. Figure 6 reports policy e¤ects on the respective coe¢ cients of variation of household disposable income and consumption. In ‡ation reduces income inequality because of the redistributive e¤ect of lump-sum transfers to sustain money growth. This negative e¤ect strengthens with higher taxes because income taxation suppresses the incentives to supply labor. This accentuates the redistributive e¤ect of in ‡ation. In ‡ation increases consumption inequality because it stimulates participation in the frictional market. Income taxation increases income inequality. One interpretation is that the negative impact of taxation on aggregate labor income overpowers its e¤ect on the standard deviation of income. Income taxation has a positive e¤ect on consumption inequality, which is likely to be related to its in ‡uence on income inequality.
Welfare.
S6. There can be a hump-shape relationship between in ‡ation and welfare at a given tax rate. The welfare-improving role of in ‡ation strengthens as the tax rate increases. Similarly, there is a hump-shape relationship between income taxation and welfare at a given in ‡ation rate. Figure 7 illustrates the welfare e¤ects. Welfare is de…ned as the weighted average of the life-time discounted value W given by (7) . In ‡ation has a positive welfare e¤ect through the following channels: increasing output, reducing income inequality, and reducing wealth inequality at higher tax rates. On the other hand, in ‡ation also has a negative welfare e¤ects by reducing savings, increasing consumption inequality and increasing wealth dispersion at lower tax rates. Overall, at a given tax rate, in ‡ation can improve welfare at lower money growth rates but reduce welfare at higher rates. The higher the tax rate, the more prominent the positive e¤ect of in ‡ation on welfare. Income taxation also has both positive and negative impacts on welfare. The positive welfare e¤ect of taxation comes through increasing savings and decreasing wealth inequality. The negative e¤ect of taxation includes decreasing output and increasing income and consumption inequalities. Altogether, at a given in ‡ation rate, income taxation can also improve welfare at lower tax rates but end up reducing it at higher tax rates.
The results in S1-S6 are robust to variation of parameter values satisfying the restriction that the labor choices of all households are strictly positive. For the sake of limited space, I only report in Table 1 the optimal monetary and …scal policies under various parameter values. The benchmark case is given in (37). For each of the other cases, only the parameter value(s) di¤erent from the benchmark case is(are) listed. In the benchmark, the optimal policy regime is = 0:98 and = 0:1. The optimal policy seems very sensitive to changes in the variability of the -shock. Recall = 0:5 and = 1:5 in the benchmark. All else equal and keeping E ( ) = 1 constant, the optimal policy goes from Since in ‡ation has no e¤ect on real activities in the frictionless market whatsoever, all of the non-trivial e¤ects of long-run in ‡ation summarized in S1-S6 are due to trading frictions. This suggests that the trading frictions can play an important role in reconciling empirical observations on the macroeconomy.
It is clear that monetary and …scal policies often have opposite yet asymmetric e¤ects on macro aggregates. Money growth directly a¤ects the intertemporal consumption choices while income taxation directly a¤ects labor choices across idiosyncratic states. To maximize welfare, a policy maker must choose the policy pair such that they optimally augment each other's positive welfare e¤ects. If the monetary and …scal authorities are independent of each other, a policy change by one often implies that the other should adjust its policy accordingly. For example, in the benchmark case, the optimal money growth rate is = 0:96 given = 0, = 0:98 given = 0:1, and = 1 given = 0:25.
Conclusion
I have constructed a tractable framework of competitive search that endogenously generates dispersion of prices, income and wealth. This model is used to study the implications of monetary and …scal policies in an environment with heterogeneous agents. With competitive search, a household's decision problems can be solved independently from the endogenous wealth distribution, which brings the model signi…cant tractability. Analytical and quantitative results suggest that monetary and …scal policies have distinctive e¤ects on real activities and welfare. Welfare-maximization requires an optimal policy mix. If the monetary and …scal authorities are separate identities, a change of policy by one has a non-trivial implication on the optimal policy choice of the other. For part (i), de…ne the left-hand side of (17) as LHS (b) and impose x = z:
where q is given by (18) with x = z. It is straightforward to derive that
where (18) 
Given all the above results, condition (27) implies that there exists z > 0 such that b > 0. Furthermore, the above results imply that the policy function b (z) is unique, which further implies that q (z) is also unique given (18) . Given x = z, (16) implies
Therefore, for z such that b > 0,
This implies that an increase of z shifts the entire function LHS (b) upwards. Because
with equality. Total di¤erentiating (17) by z yields
Given b 0 (z) > 0 and Assumption 1, rearranging the above yields q 0 (z) > 0 for all z such that b > 0. Given b > 0, one can derive that
This is because b 0 (z) > 0 and the trade surplus, u (q (z)) zE ( ), is strictly positive given b > 0, and also condition (39). Obviously, b (z) is strictly decreasing in E ( ), given the results about LHS (b) in part (ii). Then (29) implies that q (z) is strictly increasing in I now prove part (iii) and the di¤erentiability ofṼ together. If b (z) = 0 for all z, then obviouslyṼ (z) is di¤erentiable. Now consider the case where there exists z such that b (z) > 0, i.e., condition (27) holds. It is obvious that B (z) is di¤erentiable for all z such that b (z) > 0. Consider z such that b (z) > 0. Recall that a concave function has both lefthand and right-hand derivatives (see Royden, 1988, pp113-114) . LetṼ 0 (z ) andṼ 0 (z + ) be the left-hand and right-hand derivatives, respectively. SupposeṼ Given policies and , the household's decision problem is given by:
Given interior choice of l, the above reduces to
Moreover,
It follows immediately that policy functions b (z) and q (z) are given by (34) and (35).
De…ne the left-hand side of (34) as
where q is given by (35). Following the same procedure as the proof of Lemma 2, one can show that Lemma 2 also applies to this case with policies and , except that condition (27) is replaced by
and (28) 
It is clear from part (ii) of Lemma 2 that b (z) > 0 implies z > 0. Consider interior choice of z < m, which satis…es the following …rst-order condition:
Given the lottery, ifṼ (z) is strictly concave at z,
Moreover, the optimal choice of z satis…es
That is,
IfṼ (z) is linear at z, then a lottery is employed at z. In this case,Ṽ 0 (z) is trivially determined by the slopes ofṼ at the lottery prize points, L 1 (z) and L 2 (z). At both of these points,Ṽ (z) is strictly concave. Without loss of generality, I focus on z such that (47) holds and B 00 (z) < 0.
For the …scal policy e¤ect, total di¤erentiating (47) yields
Similar to (39) and (40), one can show that
and that the term within the square bracket of (48) 
where q = 1 (z k= (b)). Again, the term within the square bracket is strictly positive.
Moreover, we have @b @ > 0 according to part (ii) of this proposition. Given B 00 (z) < 0, the above equation implies that
The above part (iii) shows that z is strictly decreasing in . Moreover, part (i) of Lemma 2 that the policy functions b (z) and q (z) are strictly increasing in z. Thus, the …scal policy has a negative indirect e¤ect on both margins through its e¤ect on z. The overall e¤ect of is given by With policies, the de…nition of a stationary equilibrium must satisfy one more condition that the government balances its budget every period. For money growth, the household receives a dollar amount of ( 1) M , which is equivalent to ( 1) M= (wM 0 ) = ( 1) = (w ) units of labor. For income taxation, the amount of the government transfer in terms of labor units is LS. Altogether, the total real transfer received by a household is given by
The market-clearing condition for the general-good market is
The market-clearing condition for the labor market is aggregate demand for labor, LD, is equal to aggregate supply of labor, LS. Consider LD …rst. A household's realization of determines the money balance z ( ). Given this money balance, the resulted money balance after lotteries is L i (z ( )), i = 1; 2, which takes place with probability i (z ( )). Thus the measure of such households is N b ( ; i) = i (z ( )) dF ( ). The measure of shops corresponding to the households holding L i (z ( )) is given by
which is derived from b= (b) = N s =N b given the constant-return-to-scale matching technology. Then for each shop, the expected labor demand is k + (q) (b), which is used to compute the aggregate demand for labor in the frictional market. Thus, LD is given by
(51) The …rm's zero-pro…t condition (3) implies that for i = 1; 2, k + (q (L i (z ( )))) (b (L i (z ( )))) = L i (z ( )) (b (L i (z ( )))) :
Then (51) can be transformed to
The aggregate labor supply is given by
where G a (m) is the money distribution at the beginning of a period. Given l (m; ) from (32),
Use (49) to substitute for T in the above. Also recall the constraint for the household's lottery choice, 1 (z ( )) L 1 (z ( )) + 2 (z ( )) L 2 (z ( )) = z ( ). It follows that
The household's beginning-of-the-period balance m consists of precautionary savings and if any, the transactional balance unspent due to matching frictions. Thus,
The labor-market clearing requires LD = LS. Thus (52)-(54) together solve for the nor-30 malized wage rate in the steady state:
Note that the formula in (33) is clearly given by setting = 0 in the above equation. Given that the labor market clears, the money market clears by Walras'law. 
